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ABSTACT 
This paper establishes a crucial link between international trade and local 
organization of production. By using the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model we 
show that international trade promotes fragmentation, entrepreneurship and outsourcing due 
to the capital cost effect and the scale effect. We also unveil one source of productivity and 
formalize a link between trade and productivity. We illustrate that both the scale effect and 
the flourish of entrepreneurial talent due to capital cost effect contribute to the improvement 
of productivity. For the import competing sector the productivity effect and the scale effect 
move against each other. Accordingly, the impacts of international trade on local outsourcing 
in export sector are different from that in import competing sector. Further, we find that the 
above findings still hold in a world where the intermediate goods are tradable. In addition, 
we demonstrate that a higher trading cost involved in trading the intermediate goods 
encourages fragmentation and local outsourcing. 
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Introduction 
 
The world is increasingly characterized by the expansion of international trade. 
Previous literatures have shown that international trade has been playing a key role in 
shaping the international pattern of production, organizational forms and economic 
development. A new feature is the fast change in the local organization of production. In 
some developing countries, e.g. China and India, local outsourcing is emerging in the form of 
the establishment of new local firms serving as the intermediate goods providers for local 
final good producers.   
There is considerable evidence of this new trend. The data from the survey conducted 
jointly by the World Bank and the Enterprise Survey Organization of China in 2003 shows 
that the percentage of firms hiring subcontracting firms is 24.8% for a total sample of 2400 
firms from in 18 cities in China in 2002. While in the sector of electronic parts making, one 
of the exporting sectors in China, the percentage of firms hiring subcontracting firms reaches 
29.7%. From some recent surveys conducted through fieldwork in India Maiti and Marjit 
(2007) have found that international trade leads to separation of production and marketing 
activities. Merchants provide export orders to small fragmented units of production. These 
merchants are mostly producers of bigger firms which were primarily engaged in production 
when the markets were mainly local and national. Maiti (2008) finds that firms in formal 
sectors in India tend to concentrate on marketing while subcontracting production to low-
wage informal sectors.  
One emerging area of research in this context is the relationship between trade and 
organization of production. The important question is how international trade alters internal 
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production organization of a firm. Whether the changes in organization of firms in exporting 
sectors are different from firms in import competing sectors in these countries? What are the 
impacts on firms’ productivity as a result of change in organizational form?  In this paper we 
address these questions and propose a simple and tractable theoretical model in which firm’s 
local organizational forms are affected by international trade in a systematic way. 
International fragmentation of production and service, subsequent outsourcing of such 
fragmentation, its implications for intra-country income distribution, employment, migration, 
research and development and regulation have been well documented. Jones & Kierzkowski 
(2003), Deardoff (2001), Jones and Marjit (2001), Marjit (2007) are the recent studies 
focusing on the reasons behind fragmentation and its implications for the pattern of trade, 
specialization, income distribution and development process. Recent papers by Grossman 
and Helpman (2005) discuss the issue of outsourcing in terms of heterogeneous firms, 
incomplete contracts and product variety. Helpman (2006) and Antras (2005b) study some of 
these issues in terms of models with heterogeneous firms, trading costs and incompleteness 
of contracts based on an earlier analysis of Melitz (2003). 
The above literature, however, has not touched on the impacts of international trade 
on entrepreneurship and local outsourcing which have proliferated in recent years. Our paper 
tries to fill this void by developing a model to capture this new feature. In this paper we use a 
standard HOS framework to demonstrate how international trade can affect entrepreneurship 
and local outsourcing in a typical labor abundant economy. We consider a world in which 
there is heterogeneity of occupations of entrepreneurs who can either toil as workers in the 
industry or can set up their own firms. Capital intensive set up costs for new and small 
business deter entrepreneurship in general even if some workers can be more productive as 
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entrepreneurs. International trade leads to the declining capital cost, the capital cost effect, 
and the boost of production of the export goods, the scale effect. As a result, the productivity 
of firms in the export sector is improved as entrepreneurial talent flourishes, which we call 
the productivity effect. The local organizational forms will be changed accordingly. For the 
import competing sector the productivity effect and the scale effect will move against each 
other. Accordingly, the impacts of international trade on local outsourcing in export sector 
are different from that in import competing sector.   
Such separation and specialization of activities have been modeled in a partial 
equilibrium framework in Maiti and Marjit (2008). This paper is a general equilibrium 
construct and adopts a completely different mechanism by focusing directly on cost of capital 
and scale of production.  
 In a related paper, Jones and Marjit (2001) illustrate the role of fragmentation in 
development process by noting the fact that more liberal and open regimes are resisted by 
“older” generations because they control the source of capital and education. Vertically 
integrated processes require lumpy capital and “younger” generations can thrive better in 
world, which allows fragmentation and trade in fragments lowering the requirement of 
capital. In contrast, we take a direct route by which more trade reduces cost of capital in a 
labor abundant economy instead of comparing older and younger generations.  
 This paper is also related to Jones and Marjit (2008), which provide cases where trade 
may lead to greater number of activities relative to autarky even if one observes 
specialization. In this paper greater orientation towards export business will lead to 
diversified fresh activities hitherto contained in the vertically integrated production process 
of the export industry. Typically such an outcome will reflect productivity growth of some 
 5
kind and a regime switch affecting the relationship between commodity prices and factor 
returns. The relationship between our paper and the one popularly discussed in the literature 
is that we focus on heterogeneity of occupations of workers who can either toil as workers 
within in the industry or can set up their own firms. In a way trade creates an environment 
where entrepreneurial talent flourishes. Even if one abstracts from heterogeneity of firms, 
moral hazard or adverse selection type problems consistent with contractual complexities, the 
standard workhouse of trade theory is capable enough to address this issue.   
 Our analysis is also related to the study on incomplete contracts and trade structure by 
Antras (2003) based on the previous work by Grossman and Hart (1986). Antras (2003) 
illustrates how incomplete contracts and firm’s organizations can affect the pattern of 
international trade. He describes a world in which incomplete contracts occur when the 
production process involves noncontractible inputs while transferability of capital investment 
is allowed. Investment sharing reduces the holdup problem faced by suppliers. While capital 
cost sharing is large enough, which naturally is the case in capital-intensive processes, the 
residual rights of control and ownership should be assigned to the final-good producers. As a 
result, the attractiveness of vertical integration and the probability of intrafirm trade in 
increasing in capital-intensity of the industry. However, our analysis differs in that we focus 
on the how the pattern of international trade alters firms organizations. We address this issue 
by analyzing the scale effect and productivity effect from the international trade. 
 The paper’s analysis has four primary contributions. First, we focus on local 
organization instead of international organization. We show that local outsourcing boosts in 
export sector as entrepreneurial talent flourishes. Thus, we find that outsourcing does not 
only have an international dimension, but also an important local dimension. Second, we 
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expose traditional trade models to new issues. While heterogeneity of firms within an 
industry opens up huge reservoir of possibilities where different firms choose different 
modes of operations, even within the ambit of the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson type set up the 
export sector can be a natural domain for outsourcing related activities. Third, it has been 
widely recognized that firms’ productivity play an important role in shaping international 
trade and fragmentation.  In this paper we unveil one source of productivity and formalize a 
crucial link between trade and productivity. We illustrate that both the scale effect due to 
boost of production of the export goods and the flourish of entrepreneurial talent due to the 
declining capital cost contribute to the improvement of productivity. 
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a basic model 
and analyze the equilibrium outcomes. In section 3 we demonstrate the effect of trade on 
fragmentation and outsourcing and analyses the ‘productivity’ impact. We further examine 
how the equilibrium results with tradable intermediate goods in section 4. We offer 
concluding remarks in the final section. 
 
2. The Basic Setup  
 
It is a standard 22×  HOS framework with X being the output of the export good and 
Y that of the import-competing good. Each sector uses a different intermediate good, which 
uses only labor and used in fixed proportions with labor and capital. We first analyze the 
scenario where the intermediate goods  are non-tradable. We will relax this assumption later. 
The competitive price-equations are given by 
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We assume one unit of intermediate good is required to produce one unit of final 
good. While K and L are substitutes in the usual neo-classical sense, 1M and  M2 are not 
substitutes and required in fixed proportions. Intermediates 1M and  M2 are used in the 
vertically integrated process with some labor devoted to the production of those within the 
firm. t is the tariff rate. 
The full employment conditions are given by  
(8)                                         KYaXa
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=+++
 
(L, K) are given endowments of labor and capital. We have a small open economy, where 
production technology follows CRS and diminishing marginal productivity. It exports good 
X and imports good Y, X is labor intensive and Y is capital intensive. Since we shall work 
with a fixed set of prices, let’s set 1PP yX == . Therefore given (t, K, L) we can find out w, 
r, X and Y.  These in turn determine 212m1m M and MPP ,, .  
Some of the workers who produce 1M and  M2 also have entrepreneurial qualities. If 
they produce it on their own, they can produce with a better technology, such that 
mymymxmx ab and ab << . We assume that n such workers can get together, incur a fixed 
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cost of k and thus the total cost of obtaining such inputs from outside are rkXwbmx +  and 
rkYwbmy + , respectively. Therefore firms producing X and Y will like a vertically 
integrated process iff the following holds: 
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Market structure in the intermediate industry follows “contestability”. Positive profits 
are competed away by free entry and exit assumption. Thus 2m1m PP ,  to be charged by the 
outside entrepreneurs are given by the RHS in (9) and (10). Thus n worker-entrepreneurs get 
together and build up such a firm. Another assumption is that ),max( YbXbn mymx> . This 
implies that a part of the labor effort goes towards pure entrepreneurial supervision. 
Rewriting (9) and (10) we get, 
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Note that 
r
w
, X and Y all are impacted by t. 
For notational simplicity let us denote ( ) xmxmx d as  ba − and ( ) ymymy d as ba − . 
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If we look at the incentive constraints (13) and (14) more closely, one can easily 
check that liberal trade policies are likely to generate local outsourcing in “both” sectors. 
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While they unambiguously do it for the export sector, it is likely that they would do it for the 
import-competing sector as well. 
Rewriting (13) and (14) as )13( ′, )14( ′ 
dxt
X
r
tw ).()( ≥                  )13( ′  
dyt
X
r
tw ).()( ≥                  )14( ′  
)13( ′  and )14( ′  have to hold for outsourcing to be a viable propositions. We now use the 
standard Stolper-Samuelson and price-output response in HOS framework to draw the 
figures 1-5. 
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                Figure – 4  
 
 
                 Figure – 5 
Figure 3 shows that for low enough tariffs export sector will always go for 
outsourcing. This is the same as figure 1. Note that as t increases r and Y both increase. Out 
of four possible cases if 
Y
r
 does not decline too fast, outsourcing will be opted by the 
import-competing producers where tariffs are relatively low. Thus for lower tariff both 
sectors will go for local outsourcing. We are now ready to propose the following: 
)(14 ′RHS
)(tw
t
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Proposition I: A low enough tariff will lead to fragmentation and local outsourcing in 
the export sector. If a decline in tariff does not sharply reduce Y relative to r, lower 
tariff will also encourage fragmentation and outsourcing in the import-competing 
sector. 
 
Proof: See the discussion above. 
As tariff goes down cost of capital falls in a labor-abundant country and the export-
volume increases. Both are conducive for entrepreneurship to flourish. Workers in spite of 
being more productive as entrepreneurs (dx > 0) cannot open their own business because 
capital is costly. Thus greater trade leads to outsourcing in the export sector.  
For the import-competing sector same thing may not happen when t goes up as cost 
of capital and volume of Y both rise at the same time reflecting nothing on the net incentive 
for outsourcing in the sector. However as we have shown as long as )(t
Y
r
 does not fall too 
rapidly, the possibility of outsourcing in this sector seems to be greater with a liberal trade 
policies. Thus local outsourcing is encouraged by lower tariff in this sector as well.                
 
3. Equilibrium with Fragmentation and Outsourcing in the Export Sector 
 
 Once tariff clears a critical level fragmentation and local outsourcing become possible 
and there is a regime shift in the way production is locally organized. Therefore, one needs to 
solve for the new equilibrium values. We assume that such a switch occurs only in the export 
sector and specify the equilibrium conditions accordingly. We discuss existence of such 
equilibrium in detail in the appendix. 
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The new general equilibrium configuration is as follows: 
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n workers gather together and use k as the business set-up cost and supply the 
intermediate input from outside. As part of labor goes towards pure entrepreneurial activities 
beyond production related work, we have Xbn mx> . Given (t, w, k, L , K ) we determine w, 
r, X, Y, 1M and 2M from (15) - (20).  
For each X (t) we can derive another through this process by a function defined as 
))(( tXφ . The solution process implies whether there is a fixed point of the form  
(21)                            tXtX ))(()( φ=  
As X(t) increases 
r
w
must increase as X is labor-intensive. This is through 
productivity effect in (15). This should imply an increase in X(t) from (17) and (18). These 
are all standard HOS outcomes. Thus 0tX >φ′ ))(( . Existence and uniqueness of X (t) are 
assumed. We are more interested in the consequence of such an outcome on X (t) and factor 
returns. The formal proofs will be worked out later (See the Appendix). 
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 Figure – 6  
 
                  Note that as long as the tariff is not reduced substantially such fragmentation and 
outsourcing will not take place. However, once tariff reaches the critical threshold the 
process will be activated. Two points we need to highlight here.  
First, there will be a ‘finite’ change in the process reflecting a jump as workers 
shift themselves from inside to outside factory. Second, this will have a positive productivity 
impact for the X sector. Thus trade will have a distinct productivity impact. Such a growth in 
productivity will affect factor returns immediately. As figure-3 suggests as soon as t is 
045
)(tX
))(( txφ
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lowered beyond a critical level, 
r
w
 jumps up and then again follows a monotonically 
increasing trajectory.  
                       
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
It is also expected that 
r
w
 will increase at a sharper rate beyond the critical point as 
labor-intensities decline and capital-intensities increase for sector X. Thus the Stolper-
Samuelson type outcome gets a further boost.          
              Once the average cost of obtaining the intermediate input is directly related to the 
tariff rate, a decline in tariff also means a decline in effective cost of production for the 
export good. This is just like a productivity effect which will increase the wage rate.  
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r
w
t
7Figure −
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Proposition II: Liberal trade regime will reduce the cost of locally outsourced input and 
enhance productivity of labor-abundant country. 
 
Proof: See the discussion above. 
One issue that needs to be addressed is the transition from the state of no-outsourcing to 
outsourcing. As we have demonstrated the post-outsourcing equilibrium will throw up some 
w and r, call them 22 r  and  w . We also know that for outsourcing to be profitable we must 
have 
(22)                                             
tX
krbwaw 2mx2mx1 )(+≥  
 
Suppose ( ))(, tXr ,w 22  are such that strict equality holds for (22). Then there should 
not be any productivity effect of outsourcing. In the new equilibrium w and r will remain the 
same. With strict inequality w will increase and r will fall and the workers have incentive to 
set up their own business. An element of bargaining may be latent here if entrepreneurs form 
a syndicate and bargain for the reservation price of the intermediate in case there is no 
outsourcing. In our structure Xbn mx>  implying part of the labor effort goes towards 
specific entrepreneurial activities. The extent of such labor is given by ( Xbn mx− ), net of 
labor used for production. A decline in n will reflect improvement in entrepreneurial talent. 
This has usual general equilibrium implications. A fall in n will, via Rybczynski effect, 
increase output of X and reduce that of Y. Again this will have productivity effect acting 
through )(tX
rk
 and raising w and reducing r via Stolper-Samuelson outcome. 
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 Two issues need to be highlighted here: 
 First, in case the intermediate input is a traded input, fragmentation and outsourcing 
do not provide any extra benefit to the sector producing X except that some productive 
entrepreneur-workers locate themselves out of the industry. Further decline in t will increase 
wage via Stolper-Sameulson effect, but will not confer any additional productivity benefit. 
The fact that the price of the intermediate can fall, provides the extra productivity boost. 
Second, we have assumed that in the post-outsourcing the input is available at the average 
cost. But that may not be the case. The equilibrium price may be a contracted price. But such 
a price must be a positive function of the average cost and to that extent a rise in X will 
reduce the price of the intermediate input. 
 
4. Equilibrium with Tradable Intermediate Goods  
 
In previous sections we have demonstrated that liberal trade regime promotes 
fragmentation and local outsourcing and enhances productivity in the export sector of labor-
abundant country under the assumption that intermediate goods are non-tradable and the 
return to the entrepreneurs is the same as wage rate employed as a worker. However, in the 
real world it is possible that the intermediate goods are tradable and the return to the special 
class of entrepreneurs is different from wage rate. To capture these features, we now next 
turn to an analysis how firms’ local organization form and the return to entrepreneurs can be 
changed when the intermediate goods are tradable.  
When the intermediate goods are tradable, the local intermediate goods producer has 
an outside option of exporting the intermediate goods to the rest of the world while the final 
 18
goods producer has an outside option of purchasing the intermediate goods from the rest of 
the world. Let Wp denote the world price of the intermediate goods and T  the trading cost 
occurred when firms import or export intermediate goods.1  To simplify the analysis we 
assume that trading cost involved in import is the same as the trading cost involved in export, 
which implies that the intermediate goods producer receives TpW − if he exports its products 
to the rest of the world, while the final goods producer pays TpW + if he buys the 
intermediate goods from the rest of the world. As the equilibrium results for 0=T and 
0>T are different, we discuss these two cases separately.  
4.1 0=T  
We begin by analyzing the case when 0=T .  If 0=T , the entrepreneurs will 
establish a new firm producing the intermediate good producer if Wmx pX
rk
wb <+  .  The final 
good producer pays Mp  for the intermediate good no matter purchasing it from the local 
producer or from the rest of the world.  In this case international trade leads to the declining 
of capital cost, the capital cost effect, and the boost of production of the export goods, the 
scale effect. However, the production cost of the final good producer does not change and the 
benefit from the improvement in productivity in producing the intermediate good all accrues 
to the intermediate good producer. As a result, there is no productivity effect for the final 
good producer.  
4.2 0>T  
       Now consider the case when 0>T .  We first analyze the scenario where the local firm's 
marginal cost is lower than his net payoff from selling the intermediate goods to the rest of 
                                                 
1
 We assume
mxM wap < .  
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the world ( Tp
X
rk
wb Mmx −<+  ).2   In this event the final good producer pays TpW + if he 
buys the intermediate goods from the rest of the world while the intermediate good producer 
receives TpW − if he exports its products to the rest of the world. The difference between the 
payment of the final good producer and the payoff intermediate good producer receives leads 
to the benefit of domestic transactions ( T2 ), which the final goods producer and the 
intermediate goods producer bargain over. Let β and β−1  denote the bargaining power of 
the intermediate good producer and final good producer respectively. Let DP  denote the 
price the final good producer pays to the local intermediate good producer. Hence, we 
have TPP WD )12( −+= β . 
 One consideration for the entrepreneurs is that the return to them as entrepreneurs by 
establishing a new firm should be no less than the wage rate which is the return to them as an 
employee. This implies  
w
Xbn
X
X
rk
wbXP
mx
mxD
≥
−
+− ) (
        (23) 
 
Solving yields 
w
n
rkXTPW ≥−−+ ])12([ β         (24) 
 As noted above, w , r  and X  are function of import tariff rate t. Therefore, equation 
(24) can be rewritten as  
                                                 
2
 From  mxM wap <  and TpX
rk
wb Mmx −<+  , we can infer  that mxmx waX
rk
wb <+  .  
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  )()()(])12([ tw
n
ktrtXTPW ≥−−+ β         (24)' 
 
  From previous discussion we can infer that both the left-hand-side and right-hand-
side of (24)' increase with the tariff rate t. Therefore there are two cases showed in Figure - 8 
and Figure-9. Hence establishing a new firm will be opted by the entrepreneurs if tariffs are 
relatively low.  It also follows that a higher trading cost involved in international trade in the 
intermediate goods also promotes local outsourcing. 
                 
 
                 Figure – 8 
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                 Figure – 9 
 
We next discuss the scenario where the local firm's marginal cost is higher than his net 
payoff from selling the intermediate goods to the rest of the world but lower than the price 
the final good producer pays to the rest of the world ( Tp
X
rk
wbTp MmxM +<+<−  ). In this 
event we have ))(1()(
X
rk
wbTPP mxWD +−++= ββ . It follows that the return to 
entrepreneurs is greater than wage rate if the following condition holds. 
)()()(])1()([ tw
n
ktrtXwbTP mxW ≥−−++ βββ     (25)  
The analysis is similar to the case where Tp
X
rk
wb Mmx −<+  . The above results can be 
summarized as follows. 
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Lemma 1.  In a world where intermediate goods are tradable, Proposition 1 still 
holds. A low enough tariff will promote fragmentation and local outsourcing in the 
export sector.   
Lemma 2.  A higher trading cost involved in international trade in the intermediate 
goods also encourages fragmentation and local outsourcing. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Contemporary research in theory of international trade puts a lot of emphasis on the 
interaction between international trade and organization of production such as fragmentation 
and outsourcing. While heterogeneity of firms within an industry opens up huge reservoir of 
possibilities where different firms choose different modes of operations, even within the 
ambit of the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson type set up the export sector can be a natural domain 
for outsourcing related activities. We focus on indigenous outsourcing and entrepreneurship 
and formalize the crucial link between trade and productivity. 
               One promising avenue for future research is to extend the analysis to examine 
simultaneous outsourcing in export and import competing sector. Contractual complexities 
are also important. To outsource activities one needs to think of monitoring and provision of 
optimal contracts depending on the informational problem. Such work is becoming popular 
in trade theory, but not in terms of the standard text book model of trade. Such issues are 
discussed at length in Helpman (2006) in models of product differentiation and heterogeneity 
of firms. But similar scopes are available in the more conventional models of trade theory. 
This is the key point of the paper.      
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Appendix 
 
Existence of an Outsourcing Equilibrium in the export sector 
 
Let the initial no-outsourcing situation generates ( oooo YXrw ,,, ) as equilibrium outcomes. The 
new equilibrium with outsourcing is represented by ( YXrw ,,, ). 
 
Equation (15) - (21) determine the equilibrium and (22) must hold (with 1w  replaced by 0w  
and 2w replaced by w and 2r by r). Let us define  
mxmx P
x
rk
wb =+   
 
Outsourcing, as argued in the paper, is caused by a decline in t, with n and k jumping from an 
initial value of zero to some positive number. The new equilibrium must be such that (22) 
holds with strict inequality. 
The proof of existence proceeds as follows.  
Step I.  Find the effect of n > 0, k > 0 and a declining t on X and the condition that 
]ˆ[.ˆ
x
dx
x 0x ≡>  
Step II. Find out the effect on mxP  and the condition that .ˆ 0Pmx <  
Working with (15) – (21) and using Jones (1965) it is easy to check that  
(1A)               nrwX Ly3KKy3Lx
λ
λλ
+
λ
λλ
−
λ
δ−
= ˆ.
)ˆˆ(
ˆ
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where )( KyyLyKxxLxx θσλ+θασλ=δ  
          where sss θσλ ,,  have usual interpretation. xσ is adjusted by α  to reflect the fact that 
M is used in fixed proportions with labor and capital in X. 3Lλ  is share of n in total L and 
3Kλ is share of k in total K.   
Solving for )ˆˆ( rw − from (15) and (16) we get  
(2A)               knTXX Ly3KKy3LKx
λ
λλ
+
λ
λλ
−
λθ
−
λθ
θδ
=
ˆ
.ˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ
 
 
where =Tˆ  (1 + t ) 
 
Note that 0>θ , 0>λ  as X is labor intensive. (2A) captures the following. 
(a) The first term is nothing but formal representatives of (21). For 
stability 11 Kx <
λθ
θδ
− . The fixed point is derived on the transformed space Xˆ  rather 
than on X. Kθ is share of capital in the unit cost of the intermediate. 
(b) 0T <ˆ  implies 0rw >− )ˆˆ( , as well as 0X >ˆ . 
(c) 0n >ˆ  and 0k >ˆ have opposite effects on Xˆ . 
(d) If 3Lλ and 3Kλ are negligible i.e. n and k are small relative to total K and L, we have  
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      (3A)                  
1
1TX
Kx




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






λθ
θδ
−
λθ
−=
ˆ
ˆ
 
As t goes down, even if workers leave the export sector to become entrepreneurs and capital 
is released from production for setting up the business, X will rise in equilibrium. From (3A) 
we can stipulate that following is a set of sufficient conditions under which Xˆ > 0. 
(i) 0         ,0 K33L ≅λ≅λ  
(ii) 
λθ
θδ> k
x
.1  
Along with (i) and (ii) we must have (iii)  
(iii) 
mx0txmx0t
a)t(wLimk)t(
X
rb)t(wLim
→→
<



+  
(iii) guarantees that 
dx
k).t(
X
r(t)s.t      w  t    >∃  
 
 
